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# IN THE SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE STATE OF ALASKA THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT AT ANCHORAGE

	INCORPORATED, an
Alaska	corporation, and CHITINA
NATIVE	CORPORATION, an Alaska
corporation, and the CHITINA	
	ONAL COUNCIL, an Alaska
Native	village,

#### Plaintiffs,

#### v.

STATE OF ALASKA, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION & PUBLIC FACILITIES,

#### Defendant.

# DECEINE D

#### SFP 1 1 1991

Chambers of Judge Karen L. Hunt 3rd Judicial District

Case 3AN-91-6957 Civil Copper River Highway

#### STATE OF ALASKA'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

#### I. Introduction.

This court should summarily dispose of certain issues raised by plaintiff's complaint because there are no material facts in dispute and the state is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Brock v. Rogers and Babler, Inc. 536 P.2d 778 (Alaska 1975). The state should have summary judgment on its right of way claim because the Copper River Railroad right of way was acquired by the federal government under an Act of Congress, and transferred to the State of Alaska at statehood. The state is also entitled to summary judgment as to the trespass causes of action asserted in the complaint. Finally, punitive damages are not available as a matter of law against the State of Alaska.

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The State Acquired the Copper River Highway Right of Way at II. Statehood.

#### A. History of the Copper River Railroad:

The Copper River Railroad, which was completed in 1911, started from Cordova and ran 30 miles in an easterly direction to the mouth of the Copper River and then along the Copper River for about 100 miles to Chitina. From Chitina, it ran easterly along the Chitina River for approximately 65 miles, through the village of McCarthy, and on to Kennecott, the northern terminus of the See Opinion of Interstate Commerce Commission, Finance line. Docket No. 12164, Copper River and Northwestern Railway Company Abandonment, (April 21, 1939) at pp. 1 through 3; copy attached as appendix 1.

The original right-of-way for the construction of the railroad was acquired by the Copper River and Northwestern Railway Company under the Act of May 14, 1898, ch. 299, 30 Sta. 409 (1898), copy attached as appendix 2. The width of this right-of-way was 100 feet on either side of the center line of the railroad. section 2 of appendix 2.

The Copper River Railroad continued in operation as a railroad until 1939. On September 13, 1938, the Copper River and Northwestern Railway Company applied for permission from the ICC to abandon the operation of the entire railroad line extending from Cordova to Kennecott, a distance of approximately 195.2 miles. <u>See</u> On April 21, 1939, the ICC granted the appendix 1 at p. 1. railroad's request. See appendix 1 at p. 6.

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Because it was thought that there was significant public interest in maintaining a highway right-of-way along the route of the railroad right-of-way, Congress enacted the Act of July 15, 1941, Pub. L. 176, ch. 300, 55 Stat. 594 (1941), copy attached as appendix 3. This Act authorized the Copper River and Northwestern Railway Company to convey to the United States the following:

> (1) all or any portion of its railroad right-of-way under grants made by acquired Congress otherwise, including station and terminal grounds and lands used as sites for railroad structures or purposes of any kind, and (2) equipment, including telephone and telegraph poles and lines, ties, rail, rolling stock, bridges, buildings, and other properties in Alaska used in connection with the construction, maintenance, and operation of the railroad.

Act of July 15, 1941, 55 Stat. 594 (1941).

The Act of July 15, 1941, required that the right-of-way be used as a public highway, which operated as a dedication of the original right-of-way for use as a public highway. See 23 Am. Jur. 2d Dedication (1983).

On March 29, 1945, the Copper River and Northwestern relinguishment formally Railway Company, in a document, relinquished all of its interest in the original railroad right-ofway, including terminal and station grounds. See copy of Relinquishment Document attached as appendix 4. On May 11, 1945, the railroad's relinquishment was accepted by the Department of Interior. See appendix 5.

The Act of July 15, 1941; the relinquishment by the railroad; and the acceptance by the United States establish that, as of May 11, 1945, the United States became the owner of the STATE OF ALASKA'S MOTION FOR Page 3

PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

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original 200-foot-wide Copper River Railroad right-of-way (plus station grounds) subject to the requirement of the Act of July 15, 1941 that the right-of-way be used, as far as practicable, as a public highway.

### B. Use of the Copper River Railroad Right-of-way as a Public Highway by the United States:

At the time of the original application for abandonment of the railroad, i.e., September 13, 1938, the Alaska Road Commission (the federal agency in charge of roads before statehood) recommended immediate steps to maintain the railroad between McCarthy and Chitina and operate it by means of light equipment. See appendix 1 at p. 3. Other Alaska Road Commission Reports from 1939 to 1955 show project recommendations or expenditures portions of this right of way. See appendices 6--11. Of particular note is the 1952 Report of the Alaska Road Commission, which shows the Commission was actively pursuing a road project to connect Cordova to Chitina utilizing the roadbed of the Copper River Railroad. See appendix 10.

#### C. The State's Interest in the Copper River Highway:

On June 30, 1959, the Secretary of Commerce quitclaimed to the State of Alaska all interest that the Department of Commerce had in certain roads in Alaska, including the Copper River Highway. See the Omnibus Act Quitclaim Deed, attached as appendix 15. Attached as appendix 16 is a summary of the state's projects and expenditures on this road from 1957 to 1988. Appendix 16 is an

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State of Alaska DOT&PF, Summer 1988.

excerpt from the Final Compendium Report, Copper River Highway,

#### D. Width of the Copper River Right-of-way:

The right-of-way acquired by the railroad was 200 feet wide as provided by the Act of 1898, appendix 2, p.1. However. federal land orders widened the right of way of the Copper River Highway to 300 feet by the time it was conveyed to the state in 1959.

On August 10, 1949, the Department of Interior issued Public Land Order 601 withdrawing for road purposes land along each side of the center line of roads existing at the time in Alaska. On October 16, 1951, the Department of Interior issued Departmental Order 2665, which provided for a 300 foot width for through roads. appendix 12. On September 15, 1956, Amendment Departmental Order 2665 added the Copper River Highway to the list of through roads, thus creating a 300-foot-wide withdrawal for all portions where no entry under federal land laws had occurred. See appendix 13.

Finally, in 1958, Interior issued PLO 1613, which revoked the reservation for through roads and simultaneously established rights-of-way for those roads.

1971, Congress passed the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA). The plaintiffs Ahtna Inc., and Chitina Native Corporation are corporations organized pursuant to ANCSA. As such, they hold title to various lands as surface or subsurface estate owners. The highway right-of-way, was conveyed out of

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federal ownership in 1959, and could not be conveyed by ANCSA to ANCSA Sec. 4 also extinguished all claims to the corporations. land in Alaska based on aboriginal title.

Any and all acquisitions of surrounding lands, including Native claims under ANCSA, were subject to the existing 300 foot right-of-way for the Copper River Highway.

#### Plaintiffs Have No Cause of Action in Trespass.

In Counts I and II of their complaint, the plaintiffs allege that the state is trespassing on their lands either because the state has no valid right of way, or because the road work is outside the state's right of way. The state is entitled to summary judgment on these allegations because there is no cause of action in trespass against the state.

The Alaska Supreme Court first recognized this principle in State, Dept. of Hwys. v. Crosby, 410 P.2d 724 (Alaska 1966). In Crosby, the state took an easement and right of way across property which the owner's grantor had obtained by patent from the United States. The state did not condemn the property through an eminent domain action because it believed the patent was subject to a right of wav reservation. The Supreme Court disagreed with that claim, but reversed the lower court's action of allowing the case to proceed on a trespass theory and in granting an injunction. court held that the plaintiff could pursue its claim in inverse condemnation, but that trespass was not an appropriate claim against the state because of its power of condemnation.

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In <u>Wickwire v. Juneau</u>, 557 P.2d 783 (Alaska 1976), the court reaffirmed the principle of <u>Crosby</u>. The court said:

Although appellant asserted a claim in trespass, the trial court found the claim to be one of inverse condemnation. Relying on [Crosby, supra], we affirm that decision. The landowner's only remedy in a situation such as the one presented is inverse condemnation action for compensation for the value of the easement on the date of taking. . . An independent action based on the antecedent trespass is not permitted because if nonnegligent, that trespass, "necessarily results from the imposition of the easement;" therefore, the claim for damages from the trespass is "properly . . .considered an element of the property owner's damage due to the condemnation."

Id. at 784 (footnotes omitted).

<u>See also</u>, <u>State v Doyle</u>, 735 P.2d 733, 734 (Alaska 1987); <u>Ostrom v.</u>
<u>Alyeska</u>, 648 P.2d 986, 989 n.5 (Alaska 1982).

III. Punitive Damages May Not Be Awarded Against the State of Alaska.

In adopting AS 9.50.250--AS 9.50.280, the legislature waived the state's sovereign immunity subject to certain limitations. One such limitation, set out in AS 9.50.280, is that no punitive damages may be awarded against the State of Alaska. This section provides:

Judgment for Plaintiff. If judgment is rendered for the plaintiff, it shall be for the legal amount found due from the state with legal interest from the date it became due and without punitive damages.

#### IV. Conclusion.

The state is entitled to a ruling that it has a valid 300 foot right of way for the Copper River Highway. The court should dismiss the trespass claims in Count I and II of plaintiff's

STATE OF ALASKA'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

DEPARTMENT OF LAW OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

complaint and rule that no punitive damages may be awarded in this case.

Dated at Anchorage, Alaska this // day of September 1991.

> CHARLES E. COLE ATTORNEY GENERAL

By:

Assistant Attorney General

STATE OF ALASKA'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT